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Expansive Intervention as Neo-Institutional Learning: Root Causes in the Merida Initiative 
 
Abstract: Interventions since the 1990s have greatly expanded in policy scope. While neo-
liberals understand expansion as an attempt to work on the enabling preconditions of 
liberal market democracy, Foucauldian governmentality studies see in expansion a set of 
increasingly intrusive disciplinary techniques of responsibilization. This paper introduces 
an alternative lens: neo-institutional learning. Through a case study of the Merida 
Initiative, a U.S.-Mexican security cooperation agreement, the paper argues that 
expansion grows serendipitously out of the repetitive discovery of new, ‘deeper’ 
unknowns within a neo-institutional framework of analysis. Importantly, downward 
penetration requires deconstructing reductionist liberal-universal knowledge claims. 
Paradoxically, then, the more statebuilders learn (empirically), the less they know 
(analytically). 
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Introduction 
This article elaborates on one of the most captivating aspects of international interventions today: Their 
tendency to continuously expand the imagined social domain requiring outside empowering care. It will 
summarize the most popular theoretical perspectives on the phenomenon of expansion and critically discuss 
their respective analytical merits and weaknesses. It will, then, introduce a new conceptual lens – neo-
institutional learning – and apply it to my empirical case, the Merida Initiative, a U.S.-Mexican security 
cooperation agreement signed in October 2007. The analysis builds on new empirical material gathered 
through field interviews with leading U.S. diplomats, advocacy groups and think tanks in Washington, D.C. 
in March 2010 and November 2011. A wide range of official U.S. documents – including Congressional 
hearings, reports by the Department of State, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS), as well as Congressional Budget Justifications (CBJ) and Program 
and Budget Guides – inform the study. Internal cable reports by the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, made 
available through Wikileaks, have also been used. 
Initially conceived as a ‘fairly straightforward foreign assistance program with a focus on equipment 
purchases’, U.S. assistance to Mexico under the Merida Initiative evolved rapidly into a ‘much broader 
security partnership’ (Mariko Silver, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy at the Department of Homeland 
Security, in U.S. Congress 2010a, 23). This expansion involved policy being ‘increasingly oriented toward 
building institutional capacity and reducing the pervasive corruption that enables drug trafficking’, thereby 
moving away markedly from traditional law enforcement and drug interdiction policies, which had targeted 
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trafficking organizations directly as part of the now discredited War on Drugs (Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State 2011, 390). As this paper will expound, 
military equipment deliveries and technical professionalization were really just the beginning of a much 
more thorough discursive process of critical self-reflection on the ‘deeper’ causes of crime and violence in 
Mexico. That is, while the Merida Initiative started off as a response to the Mexican government´s ‘request 
for specific forms of U.S. equipment, training, and technical assistance’, towards the end of 2009, the 
strategy changed notably in order to ‘address some of the deeper causes of criminality in the country – 
institutional weakness, corruption, and a weak social fabric’ (Seelke and Finklea 2013, 14, emphasis 
added). There was a consensus forming within Merida´s policy community that ‘Mexicoʼs problems are 
exceedingly complex and deep-seated; [and that] any real solution to these problems will have to be no less 
encompassing’ (Brands 2009, 21).  
At the High-Level Consultative Group´s meeting – the cabinet-level binational forum which sets policy 
guidelines for the Merida Initiative – in Mexico City on 23 March 2010, the Calderón and Obama 
governments announced a wide-ranging shift in policy strategy. As former Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton explained: ‘We are expanding the Merida Initiative beyond what it was traditionally considered to 
be, because it is not just about security. Yes, that is paramount, but it is also about institution-building’ 
(Clinton 2010). U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson 
summed up what would subsequently be called colloquially ‘Merida 2.0’ and, more officially, ‘Beyond 
Merida’ (Bow 2013, 77). In a congressional hearing on ‘Next Steps for the Merida Initiative’, Jacobson 
said that the Merida Initiative was shifting to ‘an engagement that [...] institutionaliz[es] Mexican capacity 
to sustain adherence to the rule of law and respect for human rights, build strong institutions, [and] promote 
full civil society participation [...]’ (in U.S. Congress 2010a, 16). While traditional forms of technical 
assistance and equipment deliveries did not entirely stop (Olson and Wilson 2010, 3), U.S. aid policies of 
law enforcement and drug interdiction were significantly cut back in favour of a comprehensive institution-
building strategy more concerned with the ‘enabl[ing]’ environment of public security institutions (U.S. 
Embassy Mexico City 2010, 8). If Merida had initially revolved around providing the ‘Mexican military 
with the means to make war on drug-trafficking organizations’, Beyond Merida was interested in 
addressing ‘root causes’ and ‘offer[ing] direct support to society itself’ (Bow 2013, 77, 94). This was an 
expansion of the (epistemic) policy remit of intervention driven by the progressive discovery of ‘broader 
context’, ‘deeper causes’, and ‘underlying issues’ (Brands 2009, 21; Seelke and Finklea 2013, 14; Ison 
2011, 4). And it is against this background that I would like to propose a view of the Merida Initiative as 
the condensed history of post-Cold War interventionism.  
The current Mexican government of Enrique Peña Nieto is ‘aligned’ with Merida´s new socio-institutional 
focus and its emphasis on ‘strong and resilient communities’ (Acevedo 2014, 241). Political commentators 
and policy analysts seem to agree that the current Mexican President shares an understanding in which ‘the 
problems´ roots go deeper into society with the lack of rule of law, violation of human rights, and 
community distrust’ (243; see also O’Neil 2012, 2–3; ICG 2015, 2–3; Felbab-Brown 2013, 4). As for the 
Merida Initiative itself, it has recently been consolidating its emphasis on ‘community participation’ and 
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resilience by supporting the Mexican government´s ‘We are all Juárez’ program (Obregon 2011, 3; Seelke 
and Finklea 2015, 17–8).  
The academic debate on the ‘new interventionism’ (Chesterman 2005, 2) has to a large extent revolved 
around Paris´ much cited dictum of an ‘updated version of the mission civilisatrice’ (2002, 651). While 
neo-liberals, like Paris, call for enhanced policy efforts on the intangible socio-cultural preconditions of 
pluralist political competition and market economics, ‘promot[ing] ‘good’ civil society while 
simultaneously restraining its ‘bad’ variant’, Foucauldian governmentality studies oppose Western 
intervention as part of a global strategy to discipline deviant third world countries into conformity with 
‘liberal democratic norms’, thereby reproducing problematic North-South hierarchies in which 
‘industrialised countries retain the moral high ground, the right to administer development and democracy 
to the South’ (Paris 2005, 154; Abrahamsen 2004, 1454; Abrahamsen 2000, 44). Foucauldian 
governmentality studies seem to be animated by the view that the increasing involvement of powerful 
Western states and international organizations in the affairs of the global periphery is related to a strategic, 
hegemonic project to realize a utopian neo-liberal ideal of social, economic and political organization: A 
‘generalized will to empower’, or Fergusonʼs ‘“anti-politics machine” run amok’ (Gould and Ojanen 2003, 
84, 87). 
The critical point of this article is that external engagement in Mexican public security governance through 
the Merida Initiative was arguably not driven by the confident projection of liberal power, whether 
endorsed as a benevolent civilizing mission (Paris) or rejected as a set of ‘technologies of power’ through 
which the ‘North maintains and legitimizes its continued power and hegemony in the South’ (Abrahamsen 
2000, ix). Intervention in the Merida Initiative evolved above all through the ‘post-ideological’ inability to 
formulate a coherent and transformative political project, rather than out of ‘Western triumphalism’ or 
‘confiden[ce]’ (Cunliffe 2007, 53; Abrahamsen 2000, 43). It would seem as if U.S. policymakers were 
thrown into a governmental situation for which they lacked any strategic framework or grand narrative – 
liberal or other – capable of cohering a large-scale project of purposive external policy engagement. 
Somewhat counter-intuitively, expansion in the Merida Initiative grew out of an ideological void rather 
than a presence. Expansion was not driven by the increasing or repeated application of classic liberal 
episteme, but by its systematic invalidation. 
Liberal statebuilding policies of the 1990s have usually been criticized for their allegedly superficial 
character. That is, liberal policies were thought to be sabotaged by something hidden, ‘deeper’ beneath the 
level of policy targets on which intervention had been working previously (see Fukuyama 2005, 112; 1995, 
9). The lesson learnt for statebuilders was constantly the same: Policy had to go ‘deeper’ in order to finally 
enable liberal frameworks to operate properly. When policy moved ‘downwards’ accordingly, it was 
discovered with equal clarity and necessity that the new targets, too, were merely the epiphenomenal 
surface appearances of something even ‘deeper’, and so on repeatedly.  
The problem with this constant downwards and backwards displacement of causal origin is that – within a 
neo-institutional framework of analysis – each next step of intellectual penetration requires that 
policymakers shed some more of their reductionist liberal-universal knowledge claims. In neo-
institutionalism, the ‘really’ relevant knowledge (and the concomitant policy objects and tools) is always 
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slipping away beneath policymakers’ fingers, always disappearing behind the next corner, and the more 
corners they turn in the pursuit of knowledge, the less they actually know. More sharply: The more often 
policymakers draw their lessons learnt from within a neo-institutional framework of analysis, the less they 
positively know. And the less they know (in the reductionist, generalized sense of the term), the less they 
can govern in a purposive way and with the reasonable expectation of actually achieving anything (see also 
Finkenbusch 2014). 
The analysis begins by introducing the empirical case of the Merida Initiative. With a planned initial budget 
of $1.4 billion dollars, the Merida Initiative is now considered the ‘centrepiece of the U.S. Government´s 
security cooperation with Mexico’ (U.S. Congress 2009, 57), a country whose rising crime levels have 
become a focal point of international attention (ICG 2015; IISS 2008; HRW 2011). The article will, then, 
move to a critical discussion of the current academic debate on liberal interventionism and how its two 
most important strands – neo-liberals and Foucauldian governmentality studies – understand policy 
expansion. Subsequently, a new concept for interpreting expansion will be introduced: neo-institutional 
learning. The last section applies this concept to the Merida Initiative.  
 
The ‘New Interventionism’ and Expansion 
External interventions since the end of the Cold War have come a long way. While initial interventionary 
policy, roughly until the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995, focused on a set of rather limited goals such as the 
negotiation of cease-fire agreements or the monitoring of more plural and competitive electoral processes, 
contemporary metropolitan engagement in what are considered weak, failed, or fragile states and societies 
involves a wide variety of policy areas, from administrative reform to human rights training and psycho-
social counselling (on the latter, see Hughes and Pupavac 2005). Mark Duffield, for instance, has noted that 
by incorporating such diverse areas as the ‘types of economic and social policies pursued, levels of poverty, 
the degree of popular participation, the extent of corruption and criminal activity, respect for human rights, 
the role of women, the status of the media, psychological well-being, the quality of political institutions,’ 
states and societies at the frontier of Western power ‘have been opened up to levels of metropolitan 
monitoring, intervention and regulation unprecedented since the end of the colonial period’ (Duffield 2003, 
308). Equally, the targets of intervention have shifted notably from a narrow focus on formal state 
institutions to the wider associational milieu of civil society. In fact, the informal socio-cultural 
embeddedness of modern state institutions has moved to the centre-stage of contemporary policy 
discussions on state- and peacebuilding. In an OECD-study anthropologist Béatrice Pouligny, for example, 
stresses that the ‘ethos’ of institutions is not reflected in their ‘formal design’, but, instead, points to the 
‘social context within which these institutions operate and the norms that support them’ (2010, 2). Failing 
to take these ‘“intangible” (“invisible”, qualitative) dimensions’ into account would make state-building 
entirely superficial or shallow, with institutions remaining ‘“empty boxes”’ (2010, 1, 2). It is against this 
background that one may read Morten Andersen’s succinct observation in a recent review article that in 
statebuilding today ‘more weight is being put on social and contextual factors […]’ (2012, 208; see also 
Lemay-Hébert 2013). In sum, contemporary interventions seem to be marked by a tendency of expansion 
that incorporates an ever-wider range of policy areas and shifts the modes of intervention and their targets 
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from the formal realm of state institutions to the informal, associational practices of society at large 
(Chandler 2013, 284). 
This article focuses precisely on the discursive and analytical process through which international 
statebuilding – understood as the attempt to (re-) construct governance institutions capable of providing 
physical security and other basic public goods – has continuously expanded the realm of external regulatory 
practice (see also Schroeder, Chappuis, and Kocak 2013; Benner and Rotmann 2008, 43–4). More 
specifically, the object of analysis here is not the mere numerical increase of policy targets nor is it the new 
kind of ‘empowering’ policies centred on civil society. Rather, expansion will essentially refer to the 
cognitive amplification of the imagined social domain requiring external empowering care. What is 
expanding is not interventionary policy as such or the reach of governmental techniques, but the episteme 
of intervention – the scope and intellectual differentiation of the problem definition. As we will see further 
below, one might call this process epistemic expansion to the extent that it depends on the discovery and 
governmental incorporation of new types, objects, and domains of knowledge: The repeated displacement 
of the epistemologic horizon of intervention onto successively ‘deeper’ levels of causality framed in terms 
of known unknowns.  
 
The ‘New Interventionism’: A Strategic Projection of (Neo-) Liberal Power? 
Although they diverge in their normative evaluations, both neo-liberal scholars (Paris 2005; 2002; 
Chesterman 2005) and their Foucauldian governmentality critics (Abrahamsen 2000; Murray Li 2007) see 
the ‘new interventionism’ (Chesterman 2005, 2) as firmly rooted in the ideological premises of liberal 
universalism. Roland Paris, for example, has argued that peacebuilding efforts have been geared towards 
‘“transplant[ing]”’ the ‘values and institutions of the liberal democratic core into the domestic affairs of 
peripheral host statesʼ (2002, 638). For Paris, external interventions are an attempt to ‘globaliz[e] a 
particular model of domestic governance – liberal market democracy […]’ (637-8). Paris sees external 
interveners as confidently ‘act[ing] upon the belief that one model of domestic governance – liberal market 
democracy – is superior to all others’ (638). Still, there is already a palpable sense of doubt and scepticism 
present. In order to ensure a smooth transition to liberal market democracy, Western interveners are called 
upon to pursue a ‘more controlled and gradual approach’ focusing on the socio-cultural preconditions of a 
stable pluralist political system and a competitive economic order (Paris 2005, 7–8; see also Clapham 2003, 
29; critically: Chandler 2010). In this way, statebuilding seems to require naturally a ‘more interventionist 
and long-term approach’ to intervention (Paris 2005, 207). 
In this article, then, the term neo-liberal refers to those governmental approaches that continue to pursue 
market democracy as the ultimate goal of intervention, but which accept that the institutional incentives of 
subjects with bounded rationality need to be artificially (re-) constructed in order for individual decision-
making to produce collectively beneficial outcomes. As Michel Foucault wrote, neo-liberalism is 
concerned with decision-making subjects in ‘their environment, the milieu in which they live [...] to the 
extent that it is not a natural environment [...]’ (2003, 245; see also 2004). 
The governmentality perspective immediately feeds off the neo-liberal account. Governmentality studies 
basically accept and, then, construct their analyses around the claim of neo-liberals that what is at stake in 
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international statebuilding projects is ‘nothing less than an enormous experiment in social engineering’ 
(Paris 2005, 4) aiming at the ‘creation of liberal polities’ (Kahler 2010, 22). What neo-liberals see as an 
essentially benevolent attempt to spread the liberal peace is criticized by Foucauldian governmentality 
studies as a disciplinary ‘will to govern’, strategically oriented towards pacifying the tumultuous global 
periphery after the failure of Structural Adjustment (Duffield 2003, 292).Rita Abrahamsen has elaborated 
on the way in which good governance partnerships are meant to ‘produce modern, self-disciplined citizens 
and states by enlisting them as responsible agents in their own development’ (2004, 1453). A range of new 
‘mechanisms and techniques of auditing, accounting, monitoring and evaluation’ ‘simultaneously 
empower[...] and discipline[e]‘ their targets by ‘constitut[ing] and regulat[ing] the[ir] identities, behaviour, 
and choices’ (2004, 1460?, 1462). This line of reasoning is picked up by many other governmentality-
inspired authors. Kanishka Jayasuriya and Kevin Hewison (2004) continue in the same vein. They argue 
that participation and empowerment are ‘a means for instantiating the discipline of the market in the core of 
the individual participation in civil society’ (2004, 578). And Alastair Fraser stresses that ‘participation 
disciplines individual participants’ thereby ‘legitimizing the increasingly intrusive supervision of African 
political communities by Northern actors’ (2005, 319, original emphasis; see also Craig and Porter 2006; 
Murray Li 2007; Zanotti 2006). 
This article will go beyond the Foucauldian governmentality perspective by arguing that the expansive 
dynamic of intervention cannot be reduced analytically to the production of a ‘universal liberal subject’ or 
the pursuit of a ‘liberal conception of civil society’ (Abrahamsen 2000, 61). Based on my reading of the 
empirical material on the Merida Initiative, I would like to offer a different analytical perspective on the 
phenomenon of expansion – neo-institutional learning – outlined in more detail in the next section.  
As we will see further below, the expansive trajectory of the Merida Initiative was not born out of a 
governmental desire to govern as comprehensively and meticulously as possible the political, social, or 
economic affairs of Mexican society according to an idealized blueprint of liberal market democracy. In 
fact, Beyond Merida grew out of a much more defensive, even timid, learning process about the 
shortcomings of one´s own previous policies. This reactive learning process, as we will see, was over-
determined by the causal tenets and anti-foundational premises of neo-institutionalism and, in consequence, 
could not help but lead policymakers to constantly discover new, ‘deeper’ levels of causality in the 
endogenous self-production of governance problems in Mexico. At no point was there an implicit or 
explicit strategy to come up with the most comprehensive agenda for neo-liberal institution-building. I 
remember vividly an interview with former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Law 
Enforcement Affairs, David Johnson, at the National Democratic Club in Washington, D.C. in November 
2011. In that conversation I asked Johnson why he thought that international interventions around the world 
– no matter what the occasion or specific country context – always seemed to employ a standard cookie-
cutter framework of good governance, rule of law and civil society. His answer was: ‘If you have a 
hammer, everything looks like a nail’1. For a long time I thought that this expression spoke brilliantly to the 
Foucauldian governmentality argument sketched above. Nevertheless, over the course of my empirical 
investigation it gradually became apparent to me that the ‘hammer’ is not at all about the alleged one-size-
fits-all, top-down application of governmental discipline. Rather, the ‘hammer’ is the fact of being drawn 
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into a discursive learning process of neo-institutional self-critique that works through the defensive 
accommodation of interventionary policy being seen as too myopic. Short-sightedness, though, was not the 
articulation of a neo-liberal will to govern as exhaustively and meticulously as possible. Expansion in the 
Merida Initiative was arguably not about the megalomania or perfidiousness of neo-liberal 
governmentality. Instead, policymakers in the Merida Initiative were lured into a bottomless process of 
self-critique in which every realization of failure or ineffectiveness only forced them to think harder about 
what they had missed, to wonder about what was going on beneath the level of policy targets on which they 
had been working so far. A neo-institutional policy framework and the process of critical self-reflection 
that it entails repeatedly compelled the Merida Initiative to culturally, socially, and psychologically 
penetrate the intervened society further. But this was essentially a defensive, ‘post-ideological’ (Cunliffe 
2007, 53) mode of reflection rather than a confident projection of liberal power. On the contrary, expansion 
in the Merida Initiative seemed to speak for a ‘post-ideological inability to construct a viable narrative 
framework within which to situate the exercise of power’ (Cunliffe 2007, 53, emphasis added). In this 
sense, it reflected what Mark Duffield has astutely identified as ‘a deepening malaise within the liberal 
project’ (2012, 487). And the way this process unfolded was reactive, inadvertent, and incremental. In other 
words, expansion in the Merida Initiative was a much more serendipitous and ideologically empty process 
than what Foucauldian governmentality studies would suggest. 
 
Neo-Institutional Learning  
Neo-institutional economics and their definition of institutions as the ‘humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction’ (North 2009, 3) are arguably the single most important analytical framework 
shaping contemporary policies of intervention, especially after the ‘Post-Washington Consensus’ of the 
mid-1990s (Hameiri 2010, 75).  
The starting point for understanding expansion as an effect of neo-institutional learning lies in the peculiar 
way in which neo-institutional causality is constructed. Neo-institutionalism works by systematically 
locating causal origin within successively ‘deeper’ known unknowns (see also Chandler 2014, 50–1). Neo-
institutionalism is about the permanent deferral of causal explanation, its constant projection into a known 
institutional context that is still to be explored before policy may work effectively. Importantly, 
contextualization is an ongoing and expansive analytical process in neo-institutionalism. That is because 
neo-institutional policymakers cannot (legitimately) employ a fixed set of sufficiently predefined 
reductionist concepts, which would provide a foundation or causal baseline for their analyses. They cannot 
significantly reduce analytically what they learn empirically. They cannot bring to bear a reductionist, self-
contained analytical apparatus on the empirical objects and processes they encounter. 
But, how exactly does learning within neo-institutionalism work? A critical discussion of Douglass North 
and his award-winning work on institutional change may provide some useful insights. The Archimedean 
point of North´s analysis is the problematization of the simplistic behavioural assumptions of neo-classical 
economics, namely instrumental rationality. In fact, the behavioural assumption of instrumental rationality 
is identified by North as the ‘fundamental stumbling block preventing an understanding of the existence, 
formation, and evolution of institutions’ (2009, 40). Instrumental rationality cannot simply be assumed or 
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even defined substantively in any generalized way. Indeed, rationality for North is a particular kind of 
institutional ‘embeddedness’: ‘[…] [M]uch of what passes for rational choice is not so much individual 
cognition as the embeddedness of the thought process in the larger social and institutional context’ (2010, 
24). That is, rationality is a particular ‘institutional constraint’ (North 1997a, 11). So, when neo-classical 
theory was positing instrumental rationality as a universal behavioural assumption what it was really 
assuming was a ‘particular set of institutions’ (North 2009, 108). And just like human behaviour cannot be 
naively reduced to instrumental rationality, the conditioning institutional environment that produces it 
cannot be understood through a set of reductionist analytical concepts either. In fact, social sciences, 
including economics, may not ‘employ reductionism’ at all (North 2010, 83). Understanding collective 
outcomes has to be an exercise in mapping sociologically, anthropologically and psychologically the 
specific historic institutional context, which has conditioned individual choices into a particular 
collectively-harmful direction. Crucially, the main challenge for developing such a context-specific 
understanding is not to employ, as far as possible, any reductionist analytical concepts, assumptions, and 
categories. But without any foundational normative or analytical foundation, i.e. with everything being 
determined by its historical and social environment, learning from failure always involves the identification 
and exploration of a new, more encompassing institutional context. The search for context can have no 
logic conclusion in neo-institutionalism. Even though policymakers might think each time that this time 
around they have thought of all contextual variables, failure makes the undisputable point that they must 
have overlooked something, that there is a ‘deeper’ level of causality that constitutes the context of what 
they previously took for context. This is how learning in neo-institutionalism works. There are no stand-
alone conceptual entities with originary explanatory force – no analytical foundations, that is. There is 
always a new context, a ‘deeper’ level of causality. The point about North being a paradigmatic case of 
neo-institutionalism, then, is that his framework showcases how neo-institutionalism always locates causal 
origin further away in institutional context. What neo-institutionalism holds out to policymakers is the 
never-exhausted possibility and never-fulfilled obligation to make one particular, very important recurring 
analytical move: contextualization. Alastair Fraser, I believe, is putting his finger on this expansive 
movement of critical self-reflection and its need to dig ‘deeper’ which I would like to call neo-institutional 
learning: 
‘The [World] Bank persistently finds its every solution to the problem of African under-
development is undermined by factors below the level of its previous intervention and, 
driven by that discovery, has burrowed deeper and deeper into the fabric of African 
communities in order to finally reach the source of the problem’. (Fraser 2005, 336, 
emphasis added) 
 
What exactly is it that policymakers discover in this analytical framework? What is the nature of their 
findings in it? Well, they find new social products to be explained by, once again, mapping their 
institutional context or unearthing the ‘deeper’ causal mechanisms that over-determine them. In this 
framework, causality, i.e. the things one needs to know, is always located in the next lower level. So, while 
neo-institutional policymakers do get to understand more and more context-specific conditioning factors or 
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even discover a new, ‘deeper’ epistemic level – i.e. go from political science to sociology to anthropology 
to (social) psychology to pedagogy – the learning process does not actually produce substantial empirical 
findings. Neo-institutional learning is really like drinking salt-water. Learning does not satisfy one´s thirst 
for knowledge. It only produces the need to learn more so that one may finally know. In neo-institutional 
frameworks of analysis, policymakers do not find actual answers, but more questions. Things they do not 
understand, yet; things to be understood by identifying once more their institutional context.  
The key point here is that with every new step neo-institutional policymakers take in their drive to map 
idiosyncratic socio-institutional contexts, they have to throw overboard some more of the reductionist 
analytical concepts they have at hand. For every piece of context-specific understanding, policymakers 
have to cash in one of their reductionist liberal-universal knowledge chips, such as instrumental rationality 
(North 2009, 17–26). Neo-institutionalism constantly produces the effect of not-knowing-it-yet and the 
obligation to invalidate more reductionist liberal-universal knowledge claims if policymakers want to find 
out. Over time, policy analysis penetrates downwards socially and backwards temporarily (‘path 
dependency’, North 2009, 98–9, 100, 112) and, like a snowball rolling downhill, attracts more and more 
objects of government, while the universal, reductionist, generalized conceptual apparatus gets thinner and 
thinner and the amount of generalizable, universally-applicable findings get smaller and smaller. In other 
words, neo-institutional policymakers accumulate (idiosyncratic) ‘deep understanding[s]’ (Fukuyama 2005, 
120) and policy objects, but lose knowledge. In neo-institutionalism, lessons learnt are telling policymakers 
what it is that they do not know, yet. They are telling them that something is going on ‘beneath’ the targets 
of current policy and the analytical reach of the concepts which have informed it. In the wake, they are 
(often implicitly) telling policymakers that the existing categories of analysis were not enough or too 
simplistic to capture these yet-to-be-unearthed causal layers. What neo-institutional policymakers are 
actually learning is that they need to think differently, and that, in order to do so, they have to discard some 
more of the existing stock of reductionist liberal-universal knowledge claims. What neo-institutional 
policymakers are actually realizing is the uselessness or limitation of any attempt to know the world in 
reductionist liberal-universal terms. In other words, neo-institutional policy learning does not really 
produce ‘relevant new knowledge’ (Benner and Rotmann 2008, 58). It is a process of learning to unlearn. If 
there is anything that neo-institutional learning produces, it is a sort of corrosive and self-debilitating anti-
knowledge (see also Finkenbusch 2014).  
 
Neo-Institutional Learning in the Merida Initiative 
Now that we have reconstructed conceptually how learning from failure works within a neo-institutional 
framework of analysis, we may attempt an alternative interpretation of the Merida Initiative.  
As Brian Bow writes, throughout 2008 and into 2009, there was a growing criticism that despite the arrest 
(or killing) of some of the ‘most infamous cartel leaders’ there was little sign of transport routes and 
distribution networks being significantly affected by the Merida Initiative (2013, 86). Merida´s limited 
impact on the drug market led to a ‘growing sense of frustration in Washington’ and was interpreted as a 
sign that ‘the root problem in Mexico was the weakness and corruption of state institutions’ (86-7). 
According to Bow, there existed a ‘growing consensus’ among U.S. policymakers that the Mexican 
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government was ‘too fixated on the original ‘war-fighting’ agenda’ (89). In fact, in the run-up to Merida´s 
policy shift there was a wide-spread critique of traditional law enforcement policies as a ‘dysfunctional 
public security paradigm based on militarization and the use of force’ (Centro Prodh 2008, 1). Laurie 
Freemen, an outspoken NGO-critic of the Merida Initiative, opposed the agreement for its law enforcement 
focus, ‘paying little attention to the institutional reforms necessary to [...] resist [...] corruption’ (2008). 
While this kind of critique had previously been voiced primarily by a small human rights-NGO community 
centring on the influential Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) and its Mexican counterparts, 
such as Center Prodh, it was increasingly picked up by Members of Congress. Clare Seelke from the 
Congressional Research Service, for example, observed in early 2010, how ‘debates emerged within 
Congress about the balance of security vs. institution-building funding’ (2010, 13). While this debate took 
place primarily in the House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, even the U.S. Senate grew 
increasingly uneasy about Merida´s ‘one-dimensional approach’ which fatally neglected ‘underlying 
causes’ (U.S. Senate 2009, 90). ‘Beefing-up the tangible capabilities of Mexico´s police and military’ 
(Carpenter 2012, 206) put the focus of attention on the institutions which received U.S. equipment and 
training. The head of the Narcotics Affairs Section at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, for example, asked 
(rhetorically): ‘The stuff is coming, the real issue is do we have the right institutions in place to use it?’ 
(U.S. Embassy Mexico City 2009a, 3; see also U.S. Embassy Mexico City 2009b). The possibility of 
reorienting Merida´s policy was discussed in more detail by U.S. officials during the Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 
budget preparation process (Seelke and Finklea 2011, 19; see also Representative Lee, in U.S. Congress 
2010b, 6–7). At this juncture the U.S. ambassador to Mexico, Carlos Pascual, was a key figure in 
‘spearhead[ing] [the] reformulation of U.S. strategy’ (Bow 2013, 90; see also Seelke 2010, 23–4; Olson and 
Wilson 2010, 3). As Vanda Felbab-Brown from the Brookings Institution said in an interview: ‘It [Beyond 
Merida] was cooked up by key U.S. officials, like ambassador Pascual’2. And Pascual, in turn, had a strong 
professional background in statebuilding operations at the State Department where he had previously 
served as Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (now part of the Bureau of Conflict and 
Stabilization Operations (CSO)). Pascual had also testified in Congress on the general importance of 
statebuilding for U.S. foreign policy (in U.S. Congress 2008, 62) and published on the issue with prominent 
academics in the field (Krasner and Pascual 2005; see also Jones, Pascual, and Stedman 2009). His 
becoming ambassador to Mexico in 2009 had a profound impact on Merida’s policy reorientation away 
from traditional law enforcement and interdiction efforts towards a comprehensive statebuilding approach3. 
Beyond Merida´s concern for context was driven by an ontology of depth in which critical reflection 
implied penetrating further downwards to ‘the core of the problem’ (Stephens and Arimatéia da Cruz 2008, 
11). For John Bailey, for example, drug trafficking organizations were really ‘only the most pressing 
symptom’ of a whole ‘mix of forms […] of crime rooted in a robust informal economy and a civic culture 
marked by comparatively little confidence in the police-justice system and low compliance with the state´s 
law’ (2010, 3, emphasis added). Beyond Merida clearly articulated the same ontology of depth as neo-
institutional statebuilding, i.e. the notion of ‘recalcitrance encountered at successively deeper levels’ 
(Fukuyama 1995, 9, emphasis added). In their discussion of context, the advocates of Beyond Merida – 
from human rights NGOs and think tanks to U.S. diplomats and Member of Congress – were all, in fact, 
 11 
 
echoing Douglass North’s notion of an institutional ‘hierarchy, each level more costly to change than the 
previous one’ (1997b, 6; see also 2009, 8). Bailey´s understanding of Mexican ‘civic culture’, for example, 
replicates North’s emphasis on the ‘tenacious survival ability’ of ‘cultural traits’ which cannot easily be 
changed because of their ‘deep-seated[ness]’ (2009, 45, 91). 
The key analytical premise driving the emergence of the Beyond Merida framework is, I think, the 
rejection of what Pablo Prado calls a ‘reductionist optic’ (2009, 207). Prado´s critique of a ‘reductionist 
optic’ encapsulates nicely the way in which contextualization as a neo-institutional discursive practice 
worked in the Merida Initiative:  
‘That the Merida Initiative builds on the reinforcement, be it via equipment, advisory and, 
definitely, enhanced power and reaction capacity, of the armed and police forces and the 
Mexican justice system, the way these institutions function at the moment, means to start 
from the false premise that the Mexican institutions charged with providing justice and 
protection to the citizenry find themselves detached from the galloping corruption and 
infiltration by narco-trafficking into their most intimate guts, and, consequently, from this 
reductionist optic, it is feasible and reliable to invest and bet on their strengthening under 
current circumstances’. (Prado 2009, 207, author’s translation, emphasis added) 
 
Crucially, once the recipients of traditional, liberal forms of aid (technical professionalization and 
equipment deliveries) were problematized on the basis of their deficient institutional environment, the 
definition of context grew bigger and bigger. Writing shortly after the declaration of Beyond Merida, 
Olson, Shirk and Selee´s (2010) notion of context already went far beyond law enforcement institutions. 
They argued that institution-building could not possibly be ‘limited to law enforcement agencies’; it would 
have to include ‘all aspects of Mexico’s governing apparatus’ (2010, 27). And in his popular book ‘The 
Fire Next Door – Mexico’s Drug Violence and the Danger to America’, Ted Carpenter is probably 
describing the anxiety of others as much as he is revealing his own feelings when warning of the 
‘corruption and competency problems [...] throughout the country´s political system’ (2012, 205, emphasis 
added). In brief, rejecting a ‘reductionist optic’ (Prado 2009, 207) led policymakers to define the 
institutional environment in more and more encompassing terms. 
The correlate seems to have been that the time-horizon of policy engagement grew accordingly. Shannon 
O’Neil from the Council on Foreign Relations explained to Members of Congress that Beyond Merida was 
‘more ambitious’ and that ‘focus[ing] on building institutions [was] much harder to deliver than helicopters 
or boats’, but that held ‘more promise for long-term’ success (in U.S. Congress 2010a, 87). In my reading, 
O’Neil seems to be preparing the ground for a much more long-term and demanding policy engagement, 
while promising (eventual) rewards that are so much more valuable. In other words, fighting drug-
trafficking organizations directly means quick, but ineffectual gains, while institution-building means long-
term, but (potentially) more rewarding efforts. Or, as Maureen Meyer from the Washington Office on Latin 
America, explained: The ‘clear lesson of nearly two decades of efforts to confront powerful trafficking 
organizations’ is that ‘quick fix solutions divert attention from the long-term reforms in the police and 
justice sector’ (2007, 1–2). And U.S. Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
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Affairs (INL), William Brownfield, also seems to be persuading his financiers in Congress for the long haul 
when stating that Merida was ‘not a quick-fix: It is an ambitious, multiyear effort to address long-standing 
problems by building sound institutions that together will strengthen the rule of law and reduce impunity’ 
(in U.S. Congress 2011, 13).  
Notably, what started with a concrete and specific concern for the immediate recipients of U.S. law 
enforcement and interdiction aid really turned into a growing and increasingly vague sensibility or 
awareness of the larger-than-expected scope of governance problems in Mexico. Problematizing the 
recipients of liberal forms of foreign assistance was really the catalyst for a growing ‘realization’ by U.S. 
policymakers of the ‘magnitude of the problems in Mexico’ (Meyer 2011, 7). In fact, the tendency to 
inflate the Other´s deficiencies may end up with a lesson learnt in which the scope of governance problems 
is blown so far out of proportion that external interveners are all but powerless. As Ted Carpenter explains, 
‘Mexico’s drug war problems lie deeper than any modest institution-building subsidy from Washington can 
possibly fix’ (2012, 206–7, emphasis added). Carpenter´s comment, in my ears, seem to suggest that the 
obstacles of institution-building in Mexico might possibly be too big, lie too ‘deep’ for external interveners 
to do anything about them really.  
In O´Neil and Brownfield´s quotes there is still the promise to ‘solve’ Mexico´s ‘longstanding problems’. 
But the solution is deferred far into the future and external assistance can only work indirectly. Beyond 
Merida, then, articulates a realization by interveners that they are unable to directly and unmediatedly solve 
problems in other parts of the world while increasing their involvement in a set of more complicated issues 
and on a more long-term basis. Here, the discourse of institution-building serves to sketch the magnitude of 
the Other´s institutional pathologies, identifying them as the primary source of governance problems, while 
simultaneously providing international interveners with both a comprehensive to-do-list and an opportunity 
to explain possible policy failures by pointing at someone else´s short-comings. This is a discourse that is 
apologetic and interventionist at the same time (see Chandler 2010, 169).  
For the constructive critics of the Merida Initiative acknowledging the long-term and complicated nature of 
governance problems in Mexico was a major step forward. For them contextual thinking which 
incrementally discovers more ‘underlying causes’ (i.e. the ‘root causes’ of the ‘root causes’ of the ‘root 
causes’), each of which is a little bit harder to change than its predecessor, is entirely unproblematic. On the 
contrary, to many observers it would merely describe the positive learning curve of neo-institutional policy 
analyses. Nevertheless, what seems to be a reason for concern is that learning actually diminished 
policymakers´ sense of agency.  
Interveners’ sense of political agency diminished not primarily because they were constantly discovering 
new ‘root causes’ in the endogenous self-production of governance problems in Mexico and each of which 
was a little bit more immune to ‘quick fixes’. External interveners’ sense of agency diminished because 
learning within a neo-institutional framework of analysis systematically disassembled the analytical tool 
box, the political ideologies, the reductionist systems of meaning with which metropolitan policymakers 
used to cohere interventionary policy. The problem with an anti-‘reductionist optic’ (Prado 2009, 207) is 
not primarily that the to-do-list of institution-building becomes longer and longer and that the newly added 
items are successively more difficult to change. The problem is that learning through an anti-‘reductionist 
 13 
 
optic’ invalidates the existing liberal-universal forms of knowledge with which one might potentially tackle 
the ‘root causes’ which are brought to the surface. That is, learning within an anti-‘reductionist optic’ 
makes the obstacles ahead grow in number and inertia while taking apart the analytical instruments with 
which to overcome them. In this way, the entire enterprise of institution-building becomes increasingly 
difficult to conceive. Paradoxically, the more policymakers were learning about the necessity to do 
statebuilding comprehensively and in a contextually sensitive way, the less they knew how to do 
statebuilding (see Finkenbusch 2014). That is because in a neo-institutional framework of analysis pushing 
contextualization further demands deconstructing some more reductionist liberal-universal knowledge 
claims. In the process, policymakers not only discover more and more social objects which require 
empowering care, each of which is always a little bit more resistant to outside manipulation. They are also 
undercutting their own political ability to engage with these policy objects because they have been 
surrendering their reductionist analytical tools in order to discover them. The neo-institutional critique of 
law enforcement and drug interdiction policies does precisely that: It allowed policymakers in the Merida 
Initiative to develop a more nuanced, inclusive and socially-thick ‘deep understanding’ (Fukuyama 2005, 
120) of Mexican politics and state-society relations. But this came at the cost of giving up the classic liberal 
notion of rational, responsible subjecthood, which was the basis of traditional technical assistance to 
Mexico. Without this kind of foundational premise, policymakers in the Merida Initiative were increasingly 
hard-pressed to formulate any coherent and purposive policy at all.  
The flip-side of interveners invalidating their established liberal-universal forms of knowing and governing 
is that the burden of knowing and solving problems moves over to the intervened themselves. That is, 
learning within a neo-institutional framework of analysis is a process in which metropolitan interveners are 
able to (conveniently) portray themselves as ignorant and powerless while expecting the intervened to 
know and govern in their stead. While the underlying power structures between the two remain in place, the 
responsibility for substantial positive change shifts to those who have the least amount of political and 
material resources at their disposal (see also Chandler 2006; Cunliffe 2007). And, of course, Western 
policy elites retain the privilege of judging the final outcomes of ‘locally-owned’ policy efforts. 
Policymakers in the Merida Initiative seemed to have paid heed to Christof Kurz' pledge to address ‘deeply 
entrenched practices’ by shifting policy towards ‘informal institutional reform’ (2010, 209, 229). Kurz' 
critique of neoclassical economics is, in fact, reminiscent of the neo-institutional perspective formulated by 
Douglass North and inscribed into Beyond Merida: ‘The individuals who populate the state are members of 
communities and act within complex social relationships determined by their origin, family and kinship 
ties, and their positions within patron-client networks’ (2010, 222). And again, the acknowledgment of 
context is bound up with a devastating attack on reductionist liberal-universal forms of knowledge. For 
Kurz moving beyond simplistic rational choice approaches in order to take ‘path dependency’ and 
‘informal institutions’ into account involves realizing that no ‘one idealized model of the state can work 
across time and space’ (2010, 212, 218). Kurz´ argument, then, seems to reflect what David Chandler has 
recently identified as a growing ‘skepticism towards Western, liberal or modernist forms of knowledge’ 
(2015, 70; a good example is also Heathershaw 2008). In policy terms, what Kurz advocates and what 
policymakers in the Merida Initiative seem to have done is to make the transition from ‘solutionism’ to 
 14 
 
‘endogenous causality’ (Chandler 2015, 74–77). That is, while the Merida Initiative was initially based on 
the idea that ‘certain solutions were timeless and could be exported’ and that interveners possessed ‘the 
power, resources and objective knowledge necessary to solve […] problems’, Beyond Merida appears to be 
a critique of this conception of intervention (Chandler 2015, 75, 74). Beyond Merida was a way of moving 
‘away from addressing causes in universal and linear ways and towards a focus on endogenous processes 
and new institutionalist framings’ (Chandler 2015: 78). In this process, policymakers were able to shed 
their ‘thin simplifications’ (Scott 1998; see also Heathershaw 2008, 331), without necessarily becoming 
more capable of achieving their goals.  
To be clear, this is not a pledge to know less. On the contrary, it is a pledge to know more – but in the 
reductionist liberal-universal sense of the term. Engaging empirical complexity may only ever be an 
emancipatory and productive exercise if it is done from within one reductionist theoretical framework or 
another. ‘[L]ooking beyond simplistic categories and recognizing the complexity of local political 
dynamics’ is a well-taken concern (Barakat and Larson 2014, 34). But it would seem that through the 
critique of ‘oversimplified and bureaucratic response[s]’ policymakers and academics alike have so far only 
been knocking down the existing edifice of reductionist liberal-universal knowledge without substituting it 
with an equally productive alternative (Barakat and Larson 2014, 26). The encounter with social reality 
may allow us to substitute one set of causal hypotheses and analytical concepts with another – better – one. 
But the attempt to engage intellectually with a rich social reality without a predefined set of foundational 
normative premises and reductionist analytical cuts does not actually increase our grasp of the world. Our 
attempt to access social reality without the ‘distorting’ influence of reductionist liberal-universal 
knowledge claims only leads us into a world which is increasingly opaque and unamenable. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has looked at the tendency of contemporary interventions to continuously expand their 
(epistemic) policy domain.The academic debate on the ‘new interventionism’ (Chesterman 2005, 2) has so 
far been dominated by neo-liberal scholars and their Foucauldian governmentality critics. While diverging 
in their respective normative evaluations, both perspectives see contemporary metropolitan policy 
engagement as part of an ‘updated version of the mission civilisatrice’ (Paris 2002, 651; see Abrahamsen 
2000, 36). Reconstructing empirically the trajectory of the Merida Initiative, it was quite difficult to make 
out such a strategic projection of (neo-) liberal power. U.S. policymakers were arguably not on a new 
civilizing mission, but rather were confronted with a governmental problem for which they seemed to lack 
any coherent ideological framework or grand narrative. 
By taking an empirically-grounded view on the Merida Initiative, I argued that it appears to be the 
particular neo-institutional way in which complexity, i.e. ‘root causes’, was seized upon that facilitates the 
self-propelled expansion of the imagined social domain covered by interventionary policy discourse. The 
process of neo-institutional learning brings home to policymakers the need to dig ‘deeper’ 
epistemologically. That is, to understand the targets of previous policy as the social products of even 
‘deeper’ or more fundamental underlying institutions. Yet, when policy actors make this intellectual effort 
and readjust their policy practices accordingly, they are again caught up in exactly the same learning loop. 
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This is a serendipitous process of expansion and it was clearly discernible in the Merida Initiative. An anti-
‘reductionist optic’ facilitated a creeping expansion of the epistemologic horizon of intervention (Prado 
2009, 207). While advocates of Beyond Merida saw this contextualizing movement as a positive sign of 
critical self-reflection and the ability to propose more context-sensitive, bottom-up policy, there was a 
downside to it. Accessing (idiosyncratic) socio-cultural context – and, then, the context of the context of the 
context – necessitated the deconstruction of key analytical and normative assumptions, categories and 
concepts on the part of U.S. interveners, notably instrumental rationality. In this process, metropolitan 
policymakers were developing an ever more intimate ‘deep understanding’ (Fukuyama 2005, 120) of 
Mexican politics, state-society relations, and (illicit) economy while their stock of reductionist liberal-
universal knowledge claims was shrinking: The more they learnt, the less they knew (see Finkenbusch 
2014). And the less they knew in a reductionist, generalized sense, the fewer tools they had at their disposal 
in order to overcome the progressively more entrenched ‘root causes’ they were discovering. 
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